"FOR THE LIFE OF BRIAN"

"If I'm out of my mind, it's all right with me, thought Moses Herzog." -- Herzog, by Saul Bellow

There was a time, long ago, when Brian Cashman distinguished himself as the voice of sanity and reason in the Yankees Front-Office.

Andy Pettitte would pitch poorly. Tino Martinez would slump. Boston would sign David Ortiz. Jose Contreras would lose again to the Red Sox.

The Boss would fume; the tabloids snicker. Joe Torre would sip green tea. And the Tampa Hill- Billies, Connors and Emslie, would wheedle and conspire, sabotaging the roster and robbing the farm.

Meanwhile, Brian Cashman would assume the role Gene Michael once played. He'd counsel patience and discretion. He'd espouse fiscal responsibility. He'd urge the Boss to re-invest below and hold fast to his prospects.

And when the Boss heeded his GM, wisdom, more often than not, prevailed in Yankeeland. Often enough, in fact, that Cashman even persuaded the Boss in late 2005 to subdue the renegade Tampa faction and to grant him the full authority he'd deserved all along. Finally, Brian could execute his plan for the Yankees future without impediment or subversion.

Was it a Pyrrhic victory? Ten years, after all, is a long time for any sane man to spend fighting turf battles inside the Yankee bunker without it warping his perceptions and distorting his judgment. Indeed, with the team staring into the abyss for the first time throughout Cashman's tenure, the GM's recent comments utterly baffle reality. They make one wonder whether the pressure, the criticism, the regret has gotten finally to Brian Cashman and whether he has become the very deluded, irrational agent he once had to fend off.

It is the job of a GM, no less than a CEO, of course, to defend his organization and to protect his personnel in the face of failure, ridicule, and crisis. But it's one thing to justify one of A-Rod's slump as unrepresentative or to reaffirm his steadfast faith in Ian Kennedy and Phil Hughes, despite the former's cavalier remarks and the latter's vulnerability to injury-- they're still 23 and 22 years old respectively; in baseball, just children-- but it's one thing to guard the kids and quite another to defend Carl Pavano, an overgrown child. By defending the defensible and vehemently so, has Cashman not suggested he has entirely lost his purchase on reality?

"Carl Pavano", Cashman told The Daily News' Anthony McCarron, "has worked his butt off. He's always tried. He just hasn't stayed healthy... He's one of the hardest workers we've got. People don't want to realize it or look at it, but that's true. He hasn't laid down on us..."

Wait, the pitcher who missed half of 2005 and all of 2006 and set the unprecedented example of spending 18 months on the disabled list without sustaining an operable injury; the pitcher who has managed to pitch 19 games in four years; the pitcher, the Yankees very own union representative, Mike Mussina, dismisses as a malingerer and upon re-signing with the Yankees, according to Josh Feinstein, told Cashman "You're not paying me less than Pavano" -- he is "one of the hardest workers [the Yankees] got."

Well, then, Brian your organization has a very serious problem, far worse than its performance this season. Either that, or in the "people" who refuse "to realize" the self-evident "it," the Freudians have themselves a superbly dramatic illustration of the telling "slip of the tongue".

In fact, to appreciate fully just how deluded Cashman's defense of Pavano makes him sound, compare them with how, just eight months ago, the Yankee GM characterized the work ethic of one of Pavano's teammates.

About the center-fielder who delivered the GM four championship rings, Cashman, recall, had this to say,"[He] got into his music and that took away from his play," and that as a consequence, in 2005, he'd had a "terrible season".

Bernie Williams, a foundational pillar to the Yankees late 90's dynasty, neglected his responsibilities and deserted his team in 2005. However, Carl Pavano, who declined to pitch through shoulder tendinitis after the Yankees lost Wang, "is one of the hardest workers [you've] got." Bernie Williams' season in 2005 was terrible because through 141 games his OPS was down 20% from the previous season. And Carl Pavano's 4.77 ERA during the half season he actually pitched, down 37% from 2004, we assess as terrific?

In what world is Bernie Williams remiss, a disservice to his team and derelict in his responsibilities and Carl Pavano, industrious and a credit to it? Well, like Jonathan Schell, once wrote about Nixon,

"Until facts intruded he lived in a closed world in which he rarely had any experiences he had not arranged for himself. As in a dream....his communion with himself would continue uninterrupted, and the world he saw would have been co-extensive with his thought processes... And, at the center, a perfect closed circle in which he talked into his tapes and his tapes talked to him."

I only hope Cashman is more cunning and less sincere than we realize. Otherwise, he will come to share with the former President more than their influence on George Steinbrenner's legacy in common.

A LONG SEPTEMBER

"A long September and there's reason to believe maybe next year will be better than the last... I guess the losing makes you laugh a little slower. Makes you shout a little lower...

..The feeling that it's all a lot of age and no pearls... A long September... and I try to hold on to the moments of summers past.... For its one more year from Hero's Canyon... And its one more series out in Hollywood... Its been so long since I've mourned September...I guess I should." -- With Liberties, from "A Long December," by the Counting Crows.

With 40 games remaining in the Yankees' season, the team's fortunes have sunk to their lowest point, and look bleaker, than in any year in recent memory. Not since 1995, when on August 13, the Yankees were 9 games behind AL East leading Boston and 10.5 games behind wild-card leading Anaheim, has the prospect of the Yankees reaching the playoffs appeared so remote so late in the season.

Sure, baseball has its own magical way of defying the odds and thwarting the expected. Indeed, history is littered with the shredded obituaries of Yankees-haters so eager to throw dirt on the body and to gloat over the funeral that they neglect to wait for a corpse.

But at the moment, Don Quixote, himself, would be hard-pressed to make Giants of Pinstripes. The Yankees don't scare or intimidate anymore. Indeed the heat they generate arises, by and large, from their uptight, seething manager and their owners' hot-air.

That hot air has occasionally blown a balmy Tampa breeze through the New York chill. Hank is not George, the cheap and facile press comparison, notwithstanding. His magnanimity he displayed in re-signing A-Rod; his ridicule of ESPN; his unabashed regrets about Johan Santana; his refreshing candor about player injuries; his zeal to win--- have warmed the hearts of many a Yankees fan.

Still his latest missive that would ascribe the Yankees' woes to an aberrant rash of injuries from which few teams could recover may not completely qualify as a lame excuse, as his detractors claim. It does however tell a partial and self-serving story.

Yes, the Yankees' disabled list reads like a hospital roster. Wang, Posada, Matsui, Hughes, Bruney all have missed or will miss more than 50% of the season. Damon and A-Rod each spent over three weeks on the DL; and Joba's current stint, very well, may match or exceed their stay. Indeed among the Yankees opening day starting nine, only Melky Cabrera, Robinson Cano, and Bobby Abreu have played in 95% of the Yankees first 121 games. And the latter two have degenerated into the least productive regulars in the lineup.

But injuries only explain so much. The RC/G (runs created per game) averages of Derek Jeter, Robinson Cano, and Melky Cabrera all have dropped 25% or more over their totals from last year. Indeed, through 3/4 of the season the team has scored 580 runs, a pace of about 780 for the season, representing a 20% decline from 2007.

Then, too, the GM's and Manager's errors and character flaws have played a part as well. In this post, I assign Cashman his share of responsibility; in a forthcoming one, I will address Girardi's.

THE HUBRIS AND THE ARROGANCE
"Keith Hernandez said that over the weekend of the Angels series he ran into Cashman relaxing with friends in an East Hampton restaurant... 'Under another Steinbrenner he probably couldn't do that,' Cohen said"--- Bob Raisman, August 17, 2008

Despite the New York press' penchant for exaggeration, there tendency to portray public figures in black and white, either as geniuses or fools, Brian Cashman is neither. He is a competent GM, a competent GM who has betrayed some rather disconcerting character flaws of late.

Yes, Cashman deserves his due for wresting control from the George's incompetent Tampa cronies and restoring priority to the amateur draft and the farm system. Cashman also has made his share of shrewd trades over the years which do him credit, balanced, of course, by his share of grievous mistakes. The overall record is a mixed and equivocal one. (I intend to examine his record in a more thorough post in the upcoming months that will coincide with his contract's expiration at season's end.)

My reservations with Cashman's leadership began this off-season. A pettiness and arrogance surfaced that heretofore we hadn't witness Cashman betray. I can't quibble with the GM's silence during the Torre fiasco; even though, in retrospect, it seems evident he preferred Girardi to Torre. That's his prerogative. Cashman's subsequent public criticism of Torre and effort to assign his former manager blame for failures in which he played a part, in addition to his passing shots at Bernie Williams' fitness and commitment in 2005, were unseemly and shameful. In a conference at William Patterson College in January, Cashman accused his retired CF of prioritizing music to baseball in 2005 and attributing his unproductive season that year to his divided focus. Even if true-- and there's good reason to think age more than anything accounted for his decline-- the comment was unnecessary. The Yankees, effectively, retired Bernie the year earlier. Impugning his commitment two year after the fact could serve no purpose other than to besmirch his reputation. But George's protege was finished evidently. He accused his former manager of dereliction as well. In an exercise in revisionist history, Cashman charged Torre with playing Williams over more talented players. Cashman must have forgotten that he'd lost Matsui and Sheffield that year for the season's lion share and that Torre had no choice but to play Bernie. And what more talented player was Cashman referring to? Melky Cabrera? In Bernie's worst year, 2005, he was a more productive player than Melky Cabrera is or probably, ever will be.

But what Cashman did or didn't say is far less responsible for the predicament in which the Yankees now find themselves than what he did and did not do. Albeit, once again, word and deed each illustrate the same tragic overconfidence.

One wonders why Cashman was the only one-- excluding, of course, his apologists and acolytes in the blogosphere-- who couldn't see the disaster he courted in entrusting 40% to 60% of his rotation to Hughes, Kennedy, and Joba. All three rookie pitchers, untested over a full season; all three subject to inning caps; all three under 24 and as Baseball Prospectus recently has shown, susceptible to injury as a consequence. The idea that in the New York crucible-- amid the pressure and scrutiny of an adversarial press, an impatient fan base, an outspoken ownership, and the hype of the Stadium last year-- three rookie pitchers, who'd totalled 116 major league innings between them could develop, flourish, and lead their team to the playoffs seemed, even then, a fanciful pipe dream, at best, and deluded folly, at worst. (See "GM Pride and Prejudice", February 29, 2008 and "The Year the Yankees Lost the Pennant", March 31, 20008)

Most of the greatest pitchers of our generation, Maddux, Glavine, Halliday, all struggled their first full seasons pitching in the majors. Many more sustained injuries that prematurely ended them. Why Cashman thought Hughes and Kennedy should be any different baffles and incenses me to this day.

The Santana development only crystallized my misgivings about Cashman's judgment and leadership. Now, Cashman's decisions on starting pitcher rarely has distinguished itself. To the contrary, they record one folly after another: (i) Ted Lily for Jeff Weaver; (ii) Jeff Weaver for Kevin Brown, (iii) Juan Rivera, Nick Johnson, and Randy Choate for Javier Vasquez; (iv) Javier Vasquez for Randy Johnson; (v) Jose Contreras for Esteban Loiza; (vi) forsaking Ted Lilly for Kei Igawa; (vii) signing Carl Pavano and Jared Wright instead of Derek Lowe.

Eventually, Cashman, in his defense, realized it was probably more efficient and effective for an organization to cultivate starters from within. Thus, his renewed commitment to the farm system. Nonetheless, Cashman's new philosophy quickly hardened into a rigid dogma.

Of the three pitchers he gambled would renew a Yankee dynasty, he wouldn't relinquish a one. Not even for a proven ace, Not even it enabled him to retain the most promising of the three. So when the opportunity to trade Phil Hughes, Melky Cabrera, Jeff Marquez, and Mitch Hilligoss for Johan Santana--- the very ace the Yankees have lacked for 8 years running-- Cashman refused. Thus Cashman forswore not only an ace in the hand for prospects in the bush, he also ensure the pressure they'd face would be enormous.

Integrating one or two rookie pitchers is hard enough on a team where the fans, ownership, and the veteran players expect to qualify for the playoffs every year. Thinking he could integrate three without compromising his team's ability to contend was foolish and arrogant, especially where his hitters were aging and his lineup fielded only two players under 33.

What's more, a fallacy underpinned the GM's logic. Supposedly, Cashman insisted that trading prospects for a player the Yankees then would have to pay like a free-agent would be improvident because it would amount to incurring a tax. The outlay for Santana, plus the sacrifice of cheap prospects he'd have to replace with more expensive players. But this assumes that all the prospects he'd have to surrender would make the major league roster and remain there for the forseeable future and wouldn't demand more expensive replacements anyway. Will Jeff Marquez and Mitch Hilligoss ever become major leaguers? Will the Yankees have to replace Melky in CF, in the end, regardless? Will Hughes develop into a full-fledged starter who can throw 200 Innings and if so, when?

And anyway what of the tax? Did Cashman forget that the Red Sox did precisely this twice: in 1997 when they relinquished Carl Pavano and Tony Armas Jr. for Pedro Martinez and then signed Pedro to a 6-year $75 million contract and then again eight years later, in 2005, in acquiring Josh Beckett, who cost the Red Sox less in money but more in talent.

Alas, not trading for Johan Santana has come back to haunt the GM in more ways than one and not just for 2008, but for the future, too.

We can't fault Cashman for having failed to predict the injury to Wang of course. But Santana certainly would have stabilized the Yankees rotation, providing them 200 innings, and in confining one spot in the rotation to one rookie, rather two, would have alleviated much of the pressure Ian Kennedy suddenly felt to perform and may have deferred Joba's transition to the rotation to later in the season. Kennedy may have performed better; than again, he might not have. But the Yankees, certainly, would enjoyed greater latitude with him as their fifth starter and perhaps enabled him to overcome the inevitable growing pains he's now likely to face again next year.


How much of difference on the Yankees' 2008 performance would Santana have made? A cursory glance at the numbers reveals the Santana's impact would have had. Through 168 innings pitched, Johan Santana has a 2.68 ERA for the New York Mets. Let's make the generous assumption, that in the American League, that would have translated into a full point higher ERA of 3.68. Accordingly, instead of allowing 54 earned runs and 62 total runs, in the American League, Santana would have surrendered 68 earned runs and 76 total runs.

Well, Santana's 168.7 inning roughly approximate the inning totals of Hughes, Rasner, and Ponson combined. So instead of the 100 Earned Runs and 104 total runs these three Yankees starters allowed, substitute instead Santana's totals and the Yankees' runs allowed drops from its current 542 total runs, without him, to 514 with him. Plug the new variable into the Jamesian Pythagorean theorem-- (RS^2 / (RS^2 + RA^ 2))-- and the Yankees current Pythagorean record of 64-57, identical to their actual record incidentally, increases to 67-54.

Only three games, you say? Well, if the Yankees miss the playoffs, how many more games than three do you honestly think will separate them from the wild-card winner? And that's three games, through 121 played, a number only likely to expand as Santana's starts accumulate and his performance improves, as it often does late in the season.

Worse, the Santana effect isn't limited to 2008. Forsaking him will impact the Yankees in 2009 as well. Because Hughes and Kennedy didn't develop this season, and Joba, because of injury, the same innings caps will confine them next year and leave holes in the Yankees rotation. The holes will expand, in fact, because both Mussina and Pettitte are free-agents and even if they do return, can anyone honestly expect Mussina to duplicate his bravura performance in 2009?

Sure, if the Yankees can sign CC Sabathia he would more than compensate for not having a Santana in the rotation. But what makes the Yankees so sure they can? Because they can offer him the most money? After dominating the National League, why wouldn't he want to remain there, perhaps moving to some West Coast NL team, where he's currently building a house or even the Cubs. It's not a risk Cashman should have taken. Because when once every ten years a proven ace who can pitch 200 innings is available, a GM with the means at his disposal seizes the opportunity.

Woe be it unto BC if CC dislikes NY.

DOWN THE STRETCH THEY COME

The Dog Days are upon us. The stifling, oppressive heat. The grinding days and languid nights. The tired arms; the slow bats; the dull, nagging aches. 50 games separate October Men from the Boys of Summer.

It's the time when the aging Pinstriped animal, aging and wounded, trampled on by younger, fleeter rivals, is left for dead. It's the months when the Voice of Flushing gloats and the Boston gentry snicker, and from the bays of Tampa to the lakes of Minnesota, the upstart revels in a premature victory. It's the moment when the clowns at Bristol College and the apparatchiks at Pravada New England cast-off their disguises to sing eulogies for Bombers of the Bronx.

But it's also the time when the slumbering Pinstriped Monster awakens. Lying in wait, husbanding its energy and conserving its pace, it shakes off its torpor and accelerates, summoning reservoirs of will and mettle and resilience, kicking into high gear and sprinting to the finish line.

What time is it? Consult the history books. It's time for the Yankees Colossus to feed. Now is the time for him to own.

But will the 2008 incarnation prove worthy of the pedigree? Does this old team-- riddled with injuries, saddled with a makeshift rotation and chafing under a new battery-- old but beloved; beloved because human and not machine, beloved because erratic and flawed, beloved because it has taunted death and lived unto October more times in recent memory than we should ever dare have asked of her. Does it have enough left for the final stretch? Or is it too much to ask for one last glorious finish while the venerable stable bearing her name still stands before she must move on to greener but less hallowed pasteurs?

THE ROAD THROUGH PERDITION

Of this we can be certain-- the road there will task this team more than any in recent memory.

AL East leading Tampa has yet to wither. And with a pitching staff possessed of a 3.74 ERA tied for second in the AL, no dark clouds loom on the Ray's horizon. The Red Sox, on the other hand, with a dexterous balance of fiery youth and seasoned age, have weathered grave injuries, a weak and erratic bullpen, and the maelstrom Manny's presence created and then left in its wake. They lead the wild-card race and the division is theirs for the taking.

Meanwhile, just a little Chicago muscle earned gratitude in New York by throttling Cleveland and Detroit, another upstart Minnesota team no one bargained for, least of all their owner, Ebeneezer Scrooge himself, has laid its own claim to the title and with it, the consolation prize.

Worst of all, Baseball's scheduling Gods conspire against history's repetition. They send the Yankees, over the next month, not once but twice, to Disneyland's House of Hell. The Yankees play their Left Coast nemesis from August 8-10 in the middle of a ten game road trip commencing in a one-hundred degree Texan purgatory and concluding inside Minnesota's glorified strip mall and then have to rehearse the Herculean task less than four weeks later, beginning on Labor Day.

ON THE ROAD

In fact, 26 of the Yankees next 35 games are on the road and with the exception of Seattle, against formidable opponents besides. They play in Anaheim for 6 games; in Texas for 4; in Toronto, Baltimore, Tamap and Seattle for 3 each; and in Detroit for a make-up game. In between, they play three games each against KC, Boston, and Toronto at home. That amounts to one truncated three game homestand and a brief six game one interposed between two trips out West.

Compare its rigor to their rivals' remaining schedules. The Red Sox, for example, don't travel to the West Coast again this season. While the Rays, on the other hand, fly west of the Rockies only once more, however to Seattle and Oakland only, without a stop in Disneyland. The Rays three remaining games against the Angels will be played at home.

I list the Yankees', Rays', and Red Sox's remaining opponents below.

YANKEES

• KC -- 3
• CWS -- 4
• Tex-- 4
• LAA -- 6
• Min-- 3
• Sea-- 3
• Det-- 1
• Tor--9
• Bal-- 6
• TB-- 6
• Bos--6

51 Games remaining-- 19 games at home, 32 games on the road

RED SOX

• KC -- 3
• CWS-- 7
• Tex-- 6
• Cle-- 4
• Tor-- 12
• Bal -- 6
• NYY-- 6
• TB -- 6

50 games remaining-- 25 games at home, 25 games on the road

RAYS

• CWS- 3
• Tex-- 3
• Det - 4
• Oak-- 3
• LAA--3
• Cle-- 3
• Min- 4
• Tor--6
• Bal-- 7
• NYY--6
• Boston-- 6

52 games remaining, 22 at home, 30 on the road.

ECLIPSING THE RAYS

The above comparison hardly favors the Yankees. In fact, of the three divisional rivals, the Yankees very well may have the most treacherous schedule of all, with the Rays, a close second. The Rays and Yanks spend a nearly equivalent amount of time on the road, where the Yankees have excelled the Rays. The Rays play .451 ball away; the Yankees, .510.

However, the rigor of the Yankees' road schedule-- including one 10 game period without an off day and one sixteen game period, each with stops in the House of Hell-- still surpasses the the Ray's. What's more, the Rays begin the final stretch six lengths ahead.

The comparative ease of the Red Sox schedule-- 50% of which are at home-- should make them odd-on favorite to repeat as division champions. The two teams that can derail them, the Blue Jays, who play them 12 times, and the White Sox, enmeshed in a division race of their own, who play them 7.

At the moment, the real threat to the Yankees' playoff chances, then, would appear to be the Rays. (The Twins could challenge as well, depending on how much Liriano bolsters their rotation.) And what distinguishes the Rays, apart from the 6 game lead in the loss column at the moment, is the Rays' superior pitching. (In fact, the Yankees and Rays possess identical Pythagorean records, the Yankees at 61-50, the Rays at 60-50-- that is, the Yankees, partly, compensate for the Rays superiority in pitching with greater offensive production. No real surprise there.)

To be more precise, however, the real disparity between the two team lies less in their pitching staffs than in their starting rotations. Their bullpens actually have performed comparably. The Rays' bullpen has posted a 3.43 ERA in 314.2 IPs; the Yankees' bullpen, a 3.64 ERA in 366 IPs.

Among the starting rotations, on the other hand, the differences pale. The Rays starting 5 has a 3.88 ERA and averages 6.1 IPs per game; Yankees has 4.41 ERA and averages 5.6 IPs per game. But closer scrutiny reveals that the variation in their third, fourth, and fifth starters' performance accounts for most of it.

Compare

• Joba's 2.24 ERA vs. Kazmir's 2.89
• Mussina's 3.44 ERA vs. Garza's 3.56 ERA
• Pettitte's 4.18 ERA vs. Shields 3.63 ERA
• Ponson's 4.81 ERA vs. Jackson's 4.20 ERA
• Rasner's 5.23 ERA vs. Sonnastine's 4.58 ERA

The Rays' 3rd, 4th, and 5th starter each have surrendered about .6 less runs per inning.

An obvious solution is one the Yankees already are considering. Some one has to supplant Rasner in the rotation. What's more, he has to perform like a fourth starter or better. Whether this pitcher is Ian Kennedy or Phil Hughes or Alfredo Aceves or Jarrod Washburn, the Yankees have to find him and find him fast. Too many more games in which their starter surrenders 5 or more runs in the first three innings and Ruth's House will indeed host its last game on September 21st. Such a move would have the added benefit of re-assigning Ponson to the fifth starter spot where his performance better suits him.

Then, too, Andy Pettitte cannot reprise either of the two dreadful outings he had to open the July 3rd series against Boston, in which he yielded 5 earned runs in less than five innings, and this last home series against Anaheim, where he yielded nine. Other than those two outings, Pettitte's been exceptional, posting a 2.29 ERA over 55 innings since June 12th. However, if Pettitte has another 10 outings this season, the Yankees cannot afford him to falter like that again. The Yankees need a quality start from Andy-- defined as 3 earned runs or less over six innings-- practically every time he toes the rubber.

If the Yankees can accomplish as much-- fill their rotation's fourth hole and stabilize Andy Pettitte -- without their bullpen or their offense regressing, the AL's fourth playoff spot will come down to the wire and the Yankees will find themselves in a photo finish.

CASHMAN CURBS HIS FARM FETISH

Since Brian Cashman assumed the title of GM in 1998, the three most distinguished trades of his tenure for position players (that is, non-pitchers), in my estimation, rank as follows:

(i) Alex Rodriguez for Alfonso Soriano (February 2004)
(ii) Bobby Abreu (and Corey Lidle) for CJ Henry, Matt Smith, Jesus Sanchez, and Carlos Monstrios (July 2006); and
(iii) David Justice for Ricky Ledee, Jake Westbrook, and Zach Day (June 2000)

Sure, the trade Cashman completed last night for Xavier Nady and Damaso Marte in exchange for Ross Ohlendorf, Jose Tabata, Jeff Karstens, and Dan McCutchen warrants celebrating.

Cashman overcame the farm fetish that has plagued his judgment over the last year-- as manifest in his decision to forsake first Santana and more recently, Sabathia-- and relinquished promising prospects for two major-league players who immediately improve their major league roster's depth, flexibility, and talent.

That being said, the trade ranks no better than fourth among the foregoing three.

Yes, the Yankees satisfied their desperate need for another productive hitter that arose with Posada and Matsui's injuries. (It shouldn't surprise anyone that once the trade deadline expires, the Yankees suddenly announce that both will undergo surgery that ends their seasons.)

The bottom third of the lineup Girardi has had to field recently of Melky, Molina, and Gardner only has underscored how woeful the Yankees' lineup has become. And by replacing Gardner's paltry production with a right-handed bat capable of league-average or better production, Xavier Nady should improve their run production and add balance to their lineup immediately. (Nady has played both corner outfield positions adeptly in addition to having seen time at 1B and in CF.)

However, Nady, his production this year notwithstanding, hardly qualifies as the premiere hitter either Justice or Abreu were in 2000 and 2006, respectively, to say nothing, of course, of Rabbi Alex.

Indeed, his rather prolific statistics in 2008 (.330/.383/.535 with 13 HRs, 26 2Bs, and 57 RBIs) represent something of an aberration. Nady's career statistical splits are .281/.337/.456 and in six profession seasons before this year, not once did Nady post an on-base percentage above .337 or a slugging percentage over .476.

Contrast these statistics with Abreu's in 2006, a player who until then, consistently walked over 100 times a year and had an on-base percentage over .393 for 8 consecutive years-- every year, that is, since he became an everday outfielder. In addition, Abreu's career slugging percentage exceeded in 2006, and still exceeds, Nady's .456 number.

Nor for that matter is Nady the established hitter Justice was in 2000 either. With minor exception, Justice posted over a .900 OPS (Slugging + OBA) almost every year he played a full season.

In other words, to have matched his previous coups in obtaining Abreu and Justice and to compensate fully for the lost production Matsui and Posada's injuries entail, Cashman would had to acquire a hitter like the Pirates' other corner outfielder, Jason Bay or perhaps, Mark Teixiera.

Of course, Cashman, in this latest deal, also obtained in Damaso Marte, a pitcher the organization has slavered over for years and the lefty-handed reliever Joe Girardi has insisted is a necessity. Given the bullpen's recent performance, however, I'm not sure I agree with him. A left-handed reliever of Marte's caliber strikes me less as a necessity than a luxury at the moment.

Left-handed batters actually have a lower batting average (.183) against Jose Veras than right-handed batters (.238) in an almost equivalent number of plate appearances. And the splits of right-handed and left-handed batters against Edwar Ramirez don't differ materially either .156 (RHs) vs. .176 against (LHs).

(In fact, in his persistent decision to play inferior right-handed lineups against left-handed pitchers, I often wonder, whether Girardi hasn't become overly enamored with the "match-up" tactic in circumstances where it isn't always warranted.)

As Joe Torre often observed, proficient relievers, regardless of from what side they throw, can retire any hitter, lefty or righty.

As for the price Cashman had to pay? Naturally, it's still too early to judge. Ricky Ledee, for instance, was the centerpiece of the Justice trade, but Jake Westbrook, in the end, developed into the more profitable dividend. Still, it appears Cashman, at the very least, yielded more than he did for Abreu. (Although with good reason: the Phillies, in Abreu's case, were eager to rid themselves of the salary.) In contrast, Ohlendorf and Tabata, each, have shown signs of the potential to develop into viable or even superior major league talents. Meanwhile Dan McCutchen recently has skyrocketed through the Yankees farm system and to many, had surpassed Alan Horne and Jeff Marquez on the organizational depth chart. (McCutchen, indeed, might have been there all along had he not neglected to inform the Yankees he takes physician-prescribed Adderall for ADHD and not earned a suspension for it after testing positive for stimulants. Evidently, McCutchen has since received medical clearance to take the drug.)

In sum, Cashman deserves praise for improving his major league roster and with it, the Yankees' ability to contend for a playoff spot this season. What's more, to do so, he surrendered four players, whatever potential they possess, unlikely to help their major league club this year.

However, two misgivings, apart from those expressed above, prevent me from giving this trade an unqualified and resounding endorsement.

First of all, the Yankee farm system's greatest weakness is a deficiency in premiere hitting prospects. And Tabata, along with Austin Jackson and Jesus Montero, numbered among their top three. Accordingly, with the Yankees' corner outfielders all over 33, and Melky Cabrera increasingly demonstrating himself little more than a fourth outfielder, I would have felt far more confident about relinquishing Tabata had the Yankees acquired Pirates' outfielder Jason Bay instead. Bay has more power, a higher career on-base percentage, and slugging percentage than Nady, and has averaged more pitches per plate appearance over his career. Bay also is signed through 2009.

I recognize the Yankees would not have received Marte in such package -- but to my mind Marte's a luxury with Bruney returning and the farm system deep in middle-relievers. And in the long-run, Bay would have been better served the Yankees as a future left-fielder than the less prolific Nady as a prospective one in right.

Which brings me to my second qualm about the deal. In his analysis of it, Newsday's Ken Davidoff writes "Nady, as long as he performs capably over the next two months, should be the Yankees' starting rightfielder in 2009, allowing the club to bid farewell to Bobby Abreu."
http://www.newsday.com/sports/baseball/yankees/ny-spken265778188jul26,0,380684.column

If the Yankees are indeed planning to act as such, I submit they would be making a major error. Xavier Nady, if perhaps minor improvement over Abreu defensively (and I'm not sure he is), certainly cannot replace Abreu's production as the Yankees 'three-hitter,' not even in Abreu's last two sub-par seasons. No, I concede, Abreu, recently, hasn't shown the same proficiency he exhibited in his first half-season with the Yankees, but his 4.3 P/PA at-bat and .BA with two-strikes, two important qualities in a hitter preceding A-Rod in the lineup, is still beyond compare, as is his speed. Accordingly, if the Yankees can re-sign Bobby for a year or two at less than the $16 million annually they currently pay him-- and by all reports, Abreu wants to return-- they should.

For if the Yankees think they can replace Abreu's spot in the lineup with Xavier Nady or Robinson Cano, for that matter, they're seriously deluding themselves. I only hope my good friend, Ken, is wrong this one time because I can't think of a worthy replacement for Abreu among next year's free-agents either. Mark Teixiera, perhaps, the one palatable alternative, is a Boras client and would cost the Yankees another Giambi-like contract-- money better spent in trying to allure CC Sabathia to the Bronx.

So let's give Cashman his due-- no deal comes easily and his farm restoration project enabled this one. However, he hardly merits canonization for this deal either.

CASHMAN'S FARM FETISH

Once upon a time the New Yankees lived a profligates' life. They spent freely. They squandered prospects. They mortgaged the farm to pay for overpriced but reliably proficient talent. Then one day in November 2005 Brian Cashman inherited the earth; or rather, he assumed the mantle of GM, in both title and prerogatives, of the most valuable sports franchise on earth. But at the time, although the New York Yankees’ payroll exceeded $200 million dollars and fielded a team of all-stars, something was amiss.

To be sure, fans flocked to the Bronx in record number and ticket prices soared and unprecedented attendance figures fed a revenue bonanza that financed dreams of a new stadium to reap millions more.

However, brilliant spectacle merely hid a rotting foundation. The Yankees weren’t winning and worse, they weren’t poised to win in the future either. The dynasty of the 1990’s had been bought at the price of a mortgaged farm system. And finally, in a post-10/20 world—that day in 2004 that shall live in infamy-- the bill had come due. Johnny Damon’s grand slam had reduced magic and mystique to a distant, receding memory.

So Brian Cashman changed all that. Brian Cashman's Yankees found religion. They stinted. They forbore. They saved. They husbanded. They stole an idea from the Boston Arrivistes and they invested in and hoarded amateur talent. Only more recently, amid the praise for the farm system Brian Cashman has replenished in three short years loom disturbing questions. Recent decisions of the Yankees GM make me, among other Yankee fans, wonder whether Brian Cashman, like Pygmalion, hasn’t fallen in love with own creation.

For twice now in six months Brian Cashman's Yankees have encountered the rarest of opportunities to improve their fortunes, immediately and dramatically. And twice now in six months the Yankees have forsaken them.

Once again, a low-rent Midwestern franchise, unable to pay its bills, auctioned off the Crown-Jewel of Baseball-- that rare precious commodity, the proven, left-handed ace in his prime. And once again, rather than buy, Brian Cashman went window-shopping instead-- sauntering past the display case to admire the splendor and to gawk at the price, only to return home with the currency he's saved lining his pockets.

In January, Cashman balked at the combined cost of relinquishing Phil Hughes (and Melky Cabrera, Jeff Marquez, Mitch Hiligoss) and signing Johan Santana to a long-term contract.

In July, Cashman balked at the combined cost of relinquishing Phil Hughes and NOT being able to sign CC Sabathia to a long-term contract. (The New York Times' Tyler Kepner and Jack Curry report Cashman was unwilling to deal with the Indians unless they granted the Yankees the kind of negotiating window the Twins gave the Mets.)

How to account for the seeming contradiction? Well, perhaps, Brian Cashman simply refuses to trade Phil Hughes. That despite Phil Hughes' susceptibility to injury, that despite Phil Hughes' baffling inconsistency, that despite Phil Hughes all too brief flourishes of brilliance, he is too precious and rare a talent with which Brian Cashman can bear to part.

Another explanation exists of course, but it's less charitable and for Yankee fans, more ominous. Perhaps, in that rare unguarded moment this off-season, Cashman confessed the truth to The New York Post when he said about his young prospects “he'd grown attached to them.” Indeed, perhaps, too attached. So attached, in fact, he no longer can appraise their value rationally.

Because with major injuries claiming his best starting pitcher and sidelining two of his best hitters, in left-field and at DH, for perhaps a month or longer; with the AL East more competitive than in recent memory and the prospect of his team missing the playoffs for the first time in 15 years as real and as dire as ever; Cashman’s recent forbearance begs a disturbing question: has stocking the farm system with young, promising talent become for him an end in itself?

Is Brian Cashman's objective to achieve self-sufficiency? Is no major league player ever worth the price of even one premiere prospect? If not for Johan Santana or for CC Sabathia, then for whom? And if not now, when? Or is it only worth the price only when Cashman can acquire a player in a salary dump for the likes of CJ Henry and Matt Smith as he did with Bobby Abreu?

After all, isn’t one of the purposes of having a farm system abounding with young talent the luxury it provides to fill a hole on the major league roster when necessary, to acquire that indispensable player at the trade deadline when injury fells a critical player? The luxury that enables a GM to cultivate and retain some prospects and to trade others because many never will fulfill their promise.

Has Brian Cashman, then, steered the Yankees from one extreme on the continuum to the other, from a prodigal team that neglects its farm system and ignores its future to one that clings to it irrationally and esteems it as an end in itself?

One shouldn't so easily dismiss the idea. Remember, Cashman came of age in the mid-1980s as a Yankees intern when The Boss was busy undermining his GMs and frittering away his best prospects, trading Jose Rijo, Jay Howell, Erick Plunk, et. al for Rickey Henderson, Doug Drabek for Rick Rhoden, Al Leiter for Jesse Barfield, and in now infamous Seinfeld lore, swapping Jay Buhner for Ken Phelps.

Cashman’s reaction may be understandable. For a thin line separates the convert from the zealot, principle from dogma, and “attachment” for fetish. But that hardly exonerates him for crossing it.

And how else to regard a General Manager’s judgment when he leaves the impression that through the dog-days of July and August, he think his team can contend for the playoffs with Darrel Rasner and Sidney Ponson as its fourth and fifth starters? Or has Cashman deluded himself that Ian Kennedy and Alfredo Aceves are adequate substitutes if Rasner and Ponson falter?

Or is that he actually believes, despite his protests to the contrary, that Phil Hughes or Chien Ming-Wang or god forbid, Carl Pavano, will heal miraculously and ride in on a white-horse to save the season?

Or is the explanation more perverse still? Perhaps, Cashman is well aware of his rotation’s inadequacy but it’s a cost he’s willing to incur to protect his beloved farm even if it means missing the playoffs for the first time in 15 years. Even if it means another season will have elapsed without a championship as an aging nucleus nears its end. For make no mistake about it, a lineup fielding 7 of 9 hitters who turn 33 or older slouches toward regression. And really, how many more years can the Yankees indispensable player, their Roy Hobbs of closers, play above his game?

You see, as much as radicals, reactionaries gamble too. They gamble with time. By turning back the clock, they risk the wrath of the Fates of Age. For once Posada, Rivera, Giambi, Abreu, and perhaps, the immortal himself, Jeter, perform no better than the statistical mean, all the Phil Hughes and Jobas and Ian Kennedys won't matter one iota. Without a Hall of Fame closer or a prolific catcher, with a lineup in which only A-Rod and Cano can still hit, the Yankees will have morphed into a more expensive version of the Blue Jays.

Meanwhile, the AL East center of gravity, with Youklis, Pedroia, Ellsbury, and Moss; Crawford, Upton, Longoria, Navvaro, will have migrated to Tampa and Boston.

And for dreams of another championship in the Bronx, it will be too late.

THE SHADOWS OBSCURING THE LIGHT

Two weeks ago I observed that although the Yankees stood mired at .500, recent trends boded well for the future. A-Rod's and Posada's return had earned them, on average, almost an an additional run per game and while their runs allowed total had stabilized.

Evidently, the numbers didn't lie. Since then, the Yankees compiled a seven game winning streak, their longest of the season-- a streak Yankee fans, naturally, hoped would catapult them past the morass of .500 forevermore.

Alas, they have since proceeded to lose three of their last four and to two consummate National League mediocrities, the Reds and the Pirates besides. True, there's no shame in losing to Cy Young frontrunner Edison Volquez. On the other hand, a genuine playoff contender doesn't fail to score a run against a Reds' pitcher making his major league debut and then three days later fail to beat a Pirates pitcher who surrendered 4 BBs through 3 innings.

Losing 6-0 to Daryl Thompson and 12-5 to Tom Gorzelany, indeed, adumbrate shadows that threaten to cast a pall over the entire Yankees season.

R.I.S.P. or R.I.P

The box-scores illustrate. Against Thompson, the Yankees stranded 7 runners on base through five innings, 3 in scoring position. They even loaded the bases with no-outs in the 3rd inning and didn't score a single run.

The trend recurred three days later against Gorzelany. Through the six innings Gorzelany pitched, the Yankees stranded 7 runners on base, 5 in scoring position. The 3rd inning again proved the bugaboo, beginning with great promise and ending in futility. Runners on first and second with no out begat runners on first and third with one out. Not a one crossed the plate. A June 23rd entry at nomaas.org notes the paradox. Although the Yankees currently rank 6th in the AL in Runs Scored, averaging 4.30 per game, they rank 12th in batting with runners in scoring position, hitting .251.

I list each Yankees' individual RISP averages in the starting lineup below. The first figure consists of their overall RISP; the second represents their RISP with 2 outs.

1) Damon-- .351, .385
2) Jeter-- .303, .333
3) Abreu -- .265, .414
4) A-Rod-- .242, .214
5) Matsui -- .338, .294
6) Giambi -- .150, .138
7) Posada-- .333, .385
8) Cano-- .213, .237
9) Cabrera- .231, .242

Of course, in such circumstance, the players themselves exercise most control over their fate and can address the shortcoming by executing. However, the number above suggest, perhaps, a few minor changes could help matters.

The Yankees might consider switching Abreu and Matsui and inverting the order of Posada and Giambi. Apart from grouping batters with higher RISP averages, the change, potentially, offers two ancillary benefits as well-- (i) spurring Abreu and (ii) dividing consecutive lefties in the middle of the order with a switch-hitter, a tactic Joe Torre especially liked. The benefits of the latter are self-evident. The benefits of the former less so, accordingly, I elaborate below.

BOOSTING BOBB-AY

Since 2007, opposing pitchers have neutralized the Yankees' three hitter's greatest asset, Abreu's plate discipline. The precitpitous drop in his walk totals bear this out. From 2004 through 2006, Abreu averaged 122 BBs per season. In 2007, the number fell to 84. Through almost half a season in 2008, the number has dropped to a paltry 28. And with it, Abreu's on-base percentage has ebbed as well. A career average on-base average of .405 eroded to .369 in '07 and .336 in '08.

Now, a superficial reading of the numbers could imply Abreu's plate discipline has diminished with age and the regression in skills all players eventually undergo. However, further examination reveals that Abreu has proven as discriminating as ever as the plate. And the decline in Abreu's walk totals stem much more from how pitchers approach him than plate recklessness. Indeed, the average number of pitches Abreu sees per plate appearance has remained constant over the same period: 4.3 in '04, 4.4 in '05, 4.45 in '06, 4.4 in '07, 4.3 in '08.

What has changed however is how pitchers attack Abreu and with good reason. A-ROD looms behind him. Opposing pitchers, as such, eager to avoid facing A-Rod with a runner on-base, refuse Abreu a free pass and make sure to throw him strikes. Because Abreu's doesn't fit the profile of the typical 3-hole, power-hitter, starters figure they have less to lose by challenging him with strikes and daring him to beat them with the bat.

The numbers attest to theory as follows. In Abreu's 321 Plate Appearances in 2008, he has faced an 0-2, 1-2, or 2-2 count in 144 of them or 45%. By contrast, Abreu has been ahead in the count 2-0, 3-0, 3-1 in only 41 plate appearances or 13% of the time.

Compare these totals to the Yankees current BB leader, Giambi, who has earned 36 walks and has averaged 4.1 pitches per plate appearance. In Giambi's 261 Plate Appearance, he, by contrast, has been behind in the count (0-2, 1-2, or 2-2) only 89 times or 34%. The occasion he has been ahead (2-0, 3-0, 3-1) 36 times or 14%, on the other hand, parallel Abreu's.

The parallel in the times they're ahead in the count combined with the discrepancy in times each is behind would tend, as such, to support the thesis that a concerted strategy on the part of opposing pitchers accounts for the difference.

Now, most hitters would envy Abreu's spot in the 3-hole, in front of A-Rod precisely because that hitter would see a greater percentage of strikes, and hence better selection of pitches to hit than he might in a different slot. But again, to reiterate, Abreu is not a classic 3-hole hitter. His greatest strength is not his power but his plate discipline and his speed. (He actually more closely fits the profile of a 2nd hitter.)

As such, placing Abreu after A-Rod might improve Abreu's ability to get on-base ahead of Posada and Giambi, without similarly diminishing Matsui's on-base percentage in the 3-hole because he has greater power than Abreu, at least when healthy, and poses a greater home-run threat if thrown strikes.

The Yankees also could experiment with Giambi in the 3-hole as well, mirroring some of the danger the Manny-Ortiz combo has presented opposing hitters the last three years.

REPLACING WANG

The other looming threat to the Yankees' season comes from the catastrophic blow Wang's injury dealt them on June 14th.

The 90-wins prefigured by the 5.1 runs per game the Yankees have averaged since Posada's return to the line-up on June 5th had assumed the team wouldn't allow more than the 4.5 to 4.6 runs per game they had registered to date. That in fact, the number, with Joba's addition to the rotation, would improve. However, with the loss of Wang, only hubris would lead one to cling to the assumption. Alas, the very quality the Yankees' GM has demonstrated in abundance over the last two years, enough, in fact, to warrant anxiety, if not consternation, about whether he can or will acquire a pitcher to alleviate the loss.

The Yankees cannot expect to overtake either the Rays or the Red Sox with Darrell Rasner and Dan Giese occupying rotation spots the Yankees expected Wang and Hughes to fill. In 2 of his last three outings, Rasner has surrendered 7 runs, an inconsistency the Yankees, perhaps, could withstand from a 5th starter or even a 4th starter, if Wang-Pettitte and a rejuvenated Mussina led it.

Giese's presence compounds the problem because the Yankees can't rely on him to pitch a full season let alone pitch effectively through a full season. In 2007, Giese threw 73 innings; in '06, 72 innings; 38 innings in '05, and 83 innings in '04. In 2008, the journeyman pitcher already thrown 73 innings. Worse, he's never pitched a full season as a starter.

Sure, Ian Kennedy could return in July and/or Phil Hughes in mid-August. But neither is likely to replace Wang in his reliability, his 6.6 inning per start average, or for that matter, equal Wang in his performance, not in '08 anyway.

Only by acquiring a pitcher from outside the organization can the Yankees realistically sustain the loss of Wang and still contend for a playoff spot. The pitcher doesn't necessarily have to be of Wang's caliber; that is, CC Sabathia, Eric Bedard, or Ben Sheets. The latter two pose their own injury and performance risks anyway. A pitcher like Derek Lowe may suffice. Still, a known commodity is a must.

The greatest obstacle, however, this year, as the trade deadline approaches, may not the scarcity of available starters, as in past years. No, the greatest obstacle the Yankees may confront this season, come July 31st, is their own GM's willingness to procure one. Indeed, Cashman's recent intrasingence about trading his prospects recalls ex-Angels GM, Bill (The Roster is Set in) Stone-man.

STONE CASH

As I have argued here before, Cashman's regard for the prospects with which, to his credit, he has replenished a barren farm system, at times, has verged on fetish. Comments he made to the New York Post, during the Santana melodrama, about the "attachment" he's developed to Hughes, Kennedy, and company indicates as much. As does the story Cashman persists in rehearsing about how he agonized over trading four middling prospects to the Phillies for Bobby Abreu in 2006. If trading a package led by CJ Henry and Matt Smith for a major league RF with a 5.5 WARP (wins over an average replacement player) keeps him awake all night and proves so traumatic, even in retrospect, that he continues to recall the epsidode, what does this say about the GM's constitution and judgment?

Call the phenomenon what you will: "the endowment fallacy"-- our tendency to price what we possess above what we would pay for it-- or "the Pygmalion effect"-- the builder's proclivity to idolize his creation. In either case, the neuroses betrays the same symptom: The value of Yankees' prospects seems to increase in direct proportion to their distance from New York.

Since Cashman assumed plenary power in 2005, one prospect selected under his tenure has made a measurable impact, Joba. Hughes' and Edwar Ramirez's contribution have been too sporadic. And while Cashman promoted Cano and Wang, they each preceded Cashman's tenure as the full-fledged GM.

Of course no prudent Yankees fan wants the GM to mortgage their future by trading a Phil Hughes or Ian Kennedy for a starter the team controls for only two months. Nonetheless, Cashman has to appreciate that the purpose of a farm system is not self-sufficiency. Rather, one of the virtues of enjoying the Yankees ample resources and having a minor-league organization teeming with young pitching prospects besides is the opportunity it offers to spread your risk by trading prospective talent for proven performance. More importantly, the GM has to capitalize while those prospects still retain their value as prospects because few will actually realize their promise.

In the meantime, Cashman has a month before the creeping shadows envelop the season in darkness. Let's hope, by then, he's seen the light.

THE LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL

Another crushing late-inning loss. Another middling homestand. Another opportunity to gain ground squandered.

"A team is its record", says Bill Parcells, the sage of banality. Well by this measure, through 64 games, the Yankees personify mediocrity. They stand at 32-32, mired at .500 for over two months, having risen to two or more games above mediocrity's benchmark twice, at 9-7 and 12-10, the last time on April 23rd.

However, if a team is its record, it is not only its record. Often, there are trends, signs, indices in how they play that a record belies, omens that betoken a future that differs from its past.

THE RETURN OF A-ROD; THE RESURGENCE OF GIAMBI

In my previous post, "History's Mirror," (May 19, 2008), I observed that through 44 games, the Yankees had scored 179 runs, a decline of 24% from the total they'd amassed at an identical point in 2007. However, the Yankees' loss of A-Rod and Posada through the lion share of those games accounted, I argued, for much of the drop.

In the 22 games since A-Rod returned to the Yankees lineup, the team has scorded 118 runs. Their average per game, that is, has risen from 4.1 runs scored to 5.2 runs scored.

If the last five of those 22 game are any indication, then Posada's return on June 5th heralds a more potent lineup still. In fact, with Giambi's resurgence, there's isn't any reason why the Yankees couldn't approximate the 6.0 runs per game they averaged in 2007, even if Cano continues to founder for the season's duration and Posada produces closer to his career average. (Giambi created 43 runs in all of 2007, according to Baseball Reference. In 2008, Giambi's Runs Creation figure already totals 40 runs.)

What does this mean for the season's duration?

Well, through 66 games, the Yankees also have allowed 300 runs or a 4.55 average per game. So let's hold this figure constant for a moment and extrapolate.

Assume the Yankees Runs Scored trend continues and the Yankees continue to score on average 5.1 runs per game for the rest of the season. (The projection, of course, basically excludes the marked increase in production they can expect from their catcher because Posada only has played in 4 of the last 22 games.)

At a 5.1 RS average and a 4.54 RA average over the Yankees remaining 96 games, James' Pyhtagorean theorem would predict a team winning percentage of .558, giving the Yankees about 53 to 53 wins over their remaining 96, and amassing them 86 to 87 wins for the season.

Should Posada's return increase the Yankees' average RS total only marginally, say from 489 total scored runs over the remaining 96 games to 528, or an average increase of .4 runs per game, the Yankees winning percentage would increase to .594, or 57 wins. and predict, in turn, a 90-win season. And if 90 wins doesn't necessarily qualify them for the playoffs, it should at least make them a viable playoff contender.

RUNS ALLOWED: CAN THE PITCHING HOLD?

Of course, the calcuations above assume the Yankees' pitching neither improves nor regresses over the season's duration.

And to be fair, the reason why the Yankees' record over the last 22 games since A-Rod's return has not risen much above its .500 benchmark is because the team has allowed more runs just as it has scored them.

Through 44 games the Yankees had allowed 197 runs, an average of 4.48 runs per game. Over the next 22 games, the Yankees surrendered 101 runs, an average of 4.59 runs per game.

Thus lies the cause for optimism. The increase in runs scored (1.1 average per game) dramatically exceeds the average increase in runs allowed over the last 22 games (.11 per game)

Given Wang and Pettitte's aberrant performances in their last four outings, in fact, the Yankees should consider themselves fortunate their average runs allowed has increased dramatically.

That it has not, however-- that Wang and Pettitte stand to improve, even if Rasner and Mussina regress and that whatever Joba provides as a 5th starter has to surpass every other alternative-- should provide some measure of confidence that the Runs Allowed figure assumed above will bear fruit in the end. In fact, should the Yankees' pitching cede, on average 4.54 runs per game over the season's duration, their runs allowed will total 736 or about 40 runs better than their 777 total of last season.

In that eventuality, a 90 win season and playoff contention doesn't defy the realm of possibility.