DOWN THE STRETCH THEY COME

The Dog Days are upon us. The stifling, oppressive heat. The grinding days and languid nights. The tired arms; the slow bats; the dull, nagging aches. 50 games separate October Men from the Boys of Summer.

It's the time when the aging Pinstriped animal, aging and wounded, trampled on by younger, fleeter rivals, is left for dead. It's the months when the Voice of Flushing gloats and the Boston gentry snicker, and from the bays of Tampa to the lakes of Minnesota, the upstart revels in a premature victory. It's the moment when the clowns at Bristol College and the apparatchiks at Pravada New England cast-off their disguises to sing eulogies for Bombers of the Bronx.

But it's also the time when the slumbering Pinstriped Monster awakens. Lying in wait, husbanding its energy and conserving its pace, it shakes off its torpor and accelerates, summoning reservoirs of will and mettle and resilience, kicking into high gear and sprinting to the finish line.

What time is it? Consult the history books. It's time for the Yankees Colossus to feed. Now is the time for him to own.

But will the 2008 incarnation prove worthy of the pedigree? Does this old team-- riddled with injuries, saddled with a makeshift rotation and chafing under a new battery-- old but beloved; beloved because human and not machine, beloved because erratic and flawed, beloved because it has taunted death and lived unto October more times in recent memory than we should ever dare have asked of her. Does it have enough left for the final stretch? Or is it too much to ask for one last glorious finish while the venerable stable bearing her name still stands before she must move on to greener but less hallowed pasteurs?

THE ROAD THROUGH PERDITION

Of this we can be certain-- the road there will task this team more than any in recent memory.

AL East leading Tampa has yet to wither. And with a pitching staff possessed of a 3.74 ERA tied for second in the AL, no dark clouds loom on the Ray's horizon. The Red Sox, on the other hand, with a dexterous balance of fiery youth and seasoned age, have weathered grave injuries, a weak and erratic bullpen, and the maelstrom Manny's presence created and then left in its wake. They lead the wild-card race and the division is theirs for the taking.

Meanwhile, just a little Chicago muscle earned gratitude in New York by throttling Cleveland and Detroit, another upstart Minnesota team no one bargained for, least of all their owner, Ebeneezer Scrooge himself, has laid its own claim to the title and with it, the consolation prize.

Worst of all, Baseball's scheduling Gods conspire against history's repetition. They send the Yankees, over the next month, not once but twice, to Disneyland's House of Hell. The Yankees play their Left Coast nemesis from August 8-10 in the middle of a ten game road trip commencing in a one-hundred degree Texan purgatory and concluding inside Minnesota's glorified strip mall and then have to rehearse the Herculean task less than four weeks later, beginning on Labor Day.

ON THE ROAD

In fact, 26 of the Yankees next 35 games are on the road and with the exception of Seattle, against formidable opponents besides. They play in Anaheim for 6 games; in Texas for 4; in Toronto, Baltimore, Tamap and Seattle for 3 each; and in Detroit for a make-up game. In between, they play three games each against KC, Boston, and Toronto at home. That amounts to one truncated three game homestand and a brief six game one interposed between two trips out West.

Compare its rigor to their rivals' remaining schedules. The Red Sox, for example, don't travel to the West Coast again this season. While the Rays, on the other hand, fly west of the Rockies only once more, however to Seattle and Oakland only, without a stop in Disneyland. The Rays three remaining games against the Angels will be played at home.

I list the Yankees', Rays', and Red Sox's remaining opponents below.

YANKEES

• KC -- 3
• CWS -- 4
• Tex-- 4
• LAA -- 6
• Min-- 3
• Sea-- 3
• Det-- 1
• Tor--9
• Bal-- 6
• TB-- 6
• Bos--6

51 Games remaining-- 19 games at home, 32 games on the road

RED SOX

• KC -- 3
• CWS-- 7
• Tex-- 6
• Cle-- 4
• Tor-- 12
• Bal -- 6
• NYY-- 6
• TB -- 6

50 games remaining-- 25 games at home, 25 games on the road

RAYS

• CWS- 3
• Tex-- 3
• Det - 4
• Oak-- 3
• LAA--3
• Cle-- 3
• Min- 4
• Tor--6
• Bal-- 7
• NYY--6
• Boston-- 6

52 games remaining, 22 at home, 30 on the road.

ECLIPSING THE RAYS

The above comparison hardly favors the Yankees. In fact, of the three divisional rivals, the Yankees very well may have the most treacherous schedule of all, with the Rays, a close second. The Rays and Yanks spend a nearly equivalent amount of time on the road, where the Yankees have excelled the Rays. The Rays play .451 ball away; the Yankees, .510.

However, the rigor of the Yankees' road schedule-- including one 10 game period without an off day and one sixteen game period, each with stops in the House of Hell-- still surpasses the the Ray's. What's more, the Rays begin the final stretch six lengths ahead.

The comparative ease of the Red Sox schedule-- 50% of which are at home-- should make them odd-on favorite to repeat as division champions. The two teams that can derail them, the Blue Jays, who play them 12 times, and the White Sox, enmeshed in a division race of their own, who play them 7.

At the moment, the real threat to the Yankees' playoff chances, then, would appear to be the Rays. (The Twins could challenge as well, depending on how much Liriano bolsters their rotation.) And what distinguishes the Rays, apart from the 6 game lead in the loss column at the moment, is the Rays' superior pitching. (In fact, the Yankees and Rays possess identical Pythagorean records, the Yankees at 61-50, the Rays at 60-50-- that is, the Yankees, partly, compensate for the Rays superiority in pitching with greater offensive production. No real surprise there.)

To be more precise, however, the real disparity between the two team lies less in their pitching staffs than in their starting rotations. Their bullpens actually have performed comparably. The Rays' bullpen has posted a 3.43 ERA in 314.2 IPs; the Yankees' bullpen, a 3.64 ERA in 366 IPs.

Among the starting rotations, on the other hand, the differences pale. The Rays starting 5 has a 3.88 ERA and averages 6.1 IPs per game; Yankees has 4.41 ERA and averages 5.6 IPs per game. But closer scrutiny reveals that the variation in their third, fourth, and fifth starters' performance accounts for most of it.

Compare

• Joba's 2.24 ERA vs. Kazmir's 2.89
• Mussina's 3.44 ERA vs. Garza's 3.56 ERA
• Pettitte's 4.18 ERA vs. Shields 3.63 ERA
• Ponson's 4.81 ERA vs. Jackson's 4.20 ERA
• Rasner's 5.23 ERA vs. Sonnastine's 4.58 ERA

The Rays' 3rd, 4th, and 5th starter each have surrendered about .6 less runs per inning.

An obvious solution is one the Yankees already are considering. Some one has to supplant Rasner in the rotation. What's more, he has to perform like a fourth starter or better. Whether this pitcher is Ian Kennedy or Phil Hughes or Alfredo Aceves or Jarrod Washburn, the Yankees have to find him and find him fast. Too many more games in which their starter surrenders 5 or more runs in the first three innings and Ruth's House will indeed host its last game on September 21st. Such a move would have the added benefit of re-assigning Ponson to the fifth starter spot where his performance better suits him.

Then, too, Andy Pettitte cannot reprise either of the two dreadful outings he had to open the July 3rd series against Boston, in which he yielded 5 earned runs in less than five innings, and this last home series against Anaheim, where he yielded nine. Other than those two outings, Pettitte's been exceptional, posting a 2.29 ERA over 55 innings since June 12th. However, if Pettitte has another 10 outings this season, the Yankees cannot afford him to falter like that again. The Yankees need a quality start from Andy-- defined as 3 earned runs or less over six innings-- practically every time he toes the rubber.

If the Yankees can accomplish as much-- fill their rotation's fourth hole and stabilize Andy Pettitte -- without their bullpen or their offense regressing, the AL's fourth playoff spot will come down to the wire and the Yankees will find themselves in a photo finish.

CASHMAN CURBS HIS FARM FETISH

Since Brian Cashman assumed the title of GM in 1998, the three most distinguished trades of his tenure for position players (that is, non-pitchers), in my estimation, rank as follows:

(i) Alex Rodriguez for Alfonso Soriano (February 2004)
(ii) Bobby Abreu (and Corey Lidle) for CJ Henry, Matt Smith, Jesus Sanchez, and Carlos Monstrios (July 2006); and
(iii) David Justice for Ricky Ledee, Jake Westbrook, and Zach Day (June 2000)

Sure, the trade Cashman completed last night for Xavier Nady and Damaso Marte in exchange for Ross Ohlendorf, Jose Tabata, Jeff Karstens, and Dan McCutchen warrants celebrating.

Cashman overcame the farm fetish that has plagued his judgment over the last year-- as manifest in his decision to forsake first Santana and more recently, Sabathia-- and relinquished promising prospects for two major-league players who immediately improve their major league roster's depth, flexibility, and talent.

That being said, the trade ranks no better than fourth among the foregoing three.

Yes, the Yankees satisfied their desperate need for another productive hitter that arose with Posada and Matsui's injuries. (It shouldn't surprise anyone that once the trade deadline expires, the Yankees suddenly announce that both will undergo surgery that ends their seasons.)

The bottom third of the lineup Girardi has had to field recently of Melky, Molina, and Gardner only has underscored how woeful the Yankees' lineup has become. And by replacing Gardner's paltry production with a right-handed bat capable of league-average or better production, Xavier Nady should improve their run production and add balance to their lineup immediately. (Nady has played both corner outfield positions adeptly in addition to having seen time at 1B and in CF.)

However, Nady, his production this year notwithstanding, hardly qualifies as the premiere hitter either Justice or Abreu were in 2000 and 2006, respectively, to say nothing, of course, of Rabbi Alex.

Indeed, his rather prolific statistics in 2008 (.330/.383/.535 with 13 HRs, 26 2Bs, and 57 RBIs) represent something of an aberration. Nady's career statistical splits are .281/.337/.456 and in six profession seasons before this year, not once did Nady post an on-base percentage above .337 or a slugging percentage over .476.

Contrast these statistics with Abreu's in 2006, a player who until then, consistently walked over 100 times a year and had an on-base percentage over .393 for 8 consecutive years-- every year, that is, since he became an everday outfielder. In addition, Abreu's career slugging percentage exceeded in 2006, and still exceeds, Nady's .456 number.

Nor for that matter is Nady the established hitter Justice was in 2000 either. With minor exception, Justice posted over a .900 OPS (Slugging + OBA) almost every year he played a full season.

In other words, to have matched his previous coups in obtaining Abreu and Justice and to compensate fully for the lost production Matsui and Posada's injuries entail, Cashman would had to acquire a hitter like the Pirates' other corner outfielder, Jason Bay or perhaps, Mark Teixiera.

Of course, Cashman, in this latest deal, also obtained in Damaso Marte, a pitcher the organization has slavered over for years and the lefty-handed reliever Joe Girardi has insisted is a necessity. Given the bullpen's recent performance, however, I'm not sure I agree with him. A left-handed reliever of Marte's caliber strikes me less as a necessity than a luxury at the moment.

Left-handed batters actually have a lower batting average (.183) against Jose Veras than right-handed batters (.238) in an almost equivalent number of plate appearances. And the splits of right-handed and left-handed batters against Edwar Ramirez don't differ materially either .156 (RHs) vs. .176 against (LHs).

(In fact, in his persistent decision to play inferior right-handed lineups against left-handed pitchers, I often wonder, whether Girardi hasn't become overly enamored with the "match-up" tactic in circumstances where it isn't always warranted.)

As Joe Torre often observed, proficient relievers, regardless of from what side they throw, can retire any hitter, lefty or righty.

As for the price Cashman had to pay? Naturally, it's still too early to judge. Ricky Ledee, for instance, was the centerpiece of the Justice trade, but Jake Westbrook, in the end, developed into the more profitable dividend. Still, it appears Cashman, at the very least, yielded more than he did for Abreu. (Although with good reason: the Phillies, in Abreu's case, were eager to rid themselves of the salary.) In contrast, Ohlendorf and Tabata, each, have shown signs of the potential to develop into viable or even superior major league talents. Meanwhile Dan McCutchen recently has skyrocketed through the Yankees farm system and to many, had surpassed Alan Horne and Jeff Marquez on the organizational depth chart. (McCutchen, indeed, might have been there all along had he not neglected to inform the Yankees he takes physician-prescribed Adderall for ADHD and not earned a suspension for it after testing positive for stimulants. Evidently, McCutchen has since received medical clearance to take the drug.)

In sum, Cashman deserves praise for improving his major league roster and with it, the Yankees' ability to contend for a playoff spot this season. What's more, to do so, he surrendered four players, whatever potential they possess, unlikely to help their major league club this year.

However, two misgivings, apart from those expressed above, prevent me from giving this trade an unqualified and resounding endorsement.

First of all, the Yankee farm system's greatest weakness is a deficiency in premiere hitting prospects. And Tabata, along with Austin Jackson and Jesus Montero, numbered among their top three. Accordingly, with the Yankees' corner outfielders all over 33, and Melky Cabrera increasingly demonstrating himself little more than a fourth outfielder, I would have felt far more confident about relinquishing Tabata had the Yankees acquired Pirates' outfielder Jason Bay instead. Bay has more power, a higher career on-base percentage, and slugging percentage than Nady, and has averaged more pitches per plate appearance over his career. Bay also is signed through 2009.

I recognize the Yankees would not have received Marte in such package -- but to my mind Marte's a luxury with Bruney returning and the farm system deep in middle-relievers. And in the long-run, Bay would have been better served the Yankees as a future left-fielder than the less prolific Nady as a prospective one in right.

Which brings me to my second qualm about the deal. In his analysis of it, Newsday's Ken Davidoff writes "Nady, as long as he performs capably over the next two months, should be the Yankees' starting rightfielder in 2009, allowing the club to bid farewell to Bobby Abreu."
http://www.newsday.com/sports/baseball/yankees/ny-spken265778188jul26,0,380684.column

If the Yankees are indeed planning to act as such, I submit they would be making a major error. Xavier Nady, if perhaps minor improvement over Abreu defensively (and I'm not sure he is), certainly cannot replace Abreu's production as the Yankees 'three-hitter,' not even in Abreu's last two sub-par seasons. No, I concede, Abreu, recently, hasn't shown the same proficiency he exhibited in his first half-season with the Yankees, but his 4.3 P/PA at-bat and .BA with two-strikes, two important qualities in a hitter preceding A-Rod in the lineup, is still beyond compare, as is his speed. Accordingly, if the Yankees can re-sign Bobby for a year or two at less than the $16 million annually they currently pay him-- and by all reports, Abreu wants to return-- they should.

For if the Yankees think they can replace Abreu's spot in the lineup with Xavier Nady or Robinson Cano, for that matter, they're seriously deluding themselves. I only hope my good friend, Ken, is wrong this one time because I can't think of a worthy replacement for Abreu among next year's free-agents either. Mark Teixiera, perhaps, the one palatable alternative, is a Boras client and would cost the Yankees another Giambi-like contract-- money better spent in trying to allure CC Sabathia to the Bronx.

So let's give Cashman his due-- no deal comes easily and his farm restoration project enabled this one. However, he hardly merits canonization for this deal either.

CASHMAN'S FARM FETISH

Once upon a time the New Yankees lived a profligates' life. They spent freely. They squandered prospects. They mortgaged the farm to pay for overpriced but reliably proficient talent. Then one day in November 2005 Brian Cashman inherited the earth; or rather, he assumed the mantle of GM, in both title and prerogatives, of the most valuable sports franchise on earth. But at the time, although the New York Yankees’ payroll exceeded $200 million dollars and fielded a team of all-stars, something was amiss.

To be sure, fans flocked to the Bronx in record number and ticket prices soared and unprecedented attendance figures fed a revenue bonanza that financed dreams of a new stadium to reap millions more.

However, brilliant spectacle merely hid a rotting foundation. The Yankees weren’t winning and worse, they weren’t poised to win in the future either. The dynasty of the 1990’s had been bought at the price of a mortgaged farm system. And finally, in a post-10/20 world—that day in 2004 that shall live in infamy-- the bill had come due. Johnny Damon’s grand slam had reduced magic and mystique to a distant, receding memory.

So Brian Cashman changed all that. Brian Cashman's Yankees found religion. They stinted. They forbore. They saved. They husbanded. They stole an idea from the Boston Arrivistes and they invested in and hoarded amateur talent. Only more recently, amid the praise for the farm system Brian Cashman has replenished in three short years loom disturbing questions. Recent decisions of the Yankees GM make me, among other Yankee fans, wonder whether Brian Cashman, like Pygmalion, hasn’t fallen in love with own creation.

For twice now in six months Brian Cashman's Yankees have encountered the rarest of opportunities to improve their fortunes, immediately and dramatically. And twice now in six months the Yankees have forsaken them.

Once again, a low-rent Midwestern franchise, unable to pay its bills, auctioned off the Crown-Jewel of Baseball-- that rare precious commodity, the proven, left-handed ace in his prime. And once again, rather than buy, Brian Cashman went window-shopping instead-- sauntering past the display case to admire the splendor and to gawk at the price, only to return home with the currency he's saved lining his pockets.

In January, Cashman balked at the combined cost of relinquishing Phil Hughes (and Melky Cabrera, Jeff Marquez, Mitch Hiligoss) and signing Johan Santana to a long-term contract.

In July, Cashman balked at the combined cost of relinquishing Phil Hughes and NOT being able to sign CC Sabathia to a long-term contract. (The New York Times' Tyler Kepner and Jack Curry report Cashman was unwilling to deal with the Indians unless they granted the Yankees the kind of negotiating window the Twins gave the Mets.)

How to account for the seeming contradiction? Well, perhaps, Brian Cashman simply refuses to trade Phil Hughes. That despite Phil Hughes' susceptibility to injury, that despite Phil Hughes' baffling inconsistency, that despite Phil Hughes all too brief flourishes of brilliance, he is too precious and rare a talent with which Brian Cashman can bear to part.

Another explanation exists of course, but it's less charitable and for Yankee fans, more ominous. Perhaps, in that rare unguarded moment this off-season, Cashman confessed the truth to The New York Post when he said about his young prospects “he'd grown attached to them.” Indeed, perhaps, too attached. So attached, in fact, he no longer can appraise their value rationally.

Because with major injuries claiming his best starting pitcher and sidelining two of his best hitters, in left-field and at DH, for perhaps a month or longer; with the AL East more competitive than in recent memory and the prospect of his team missing the playoffs for the first time in 15 years as real and as dire as ever; Cashman’s recent forbearance begs a disturbing question: has stocking the farm system with young, promising talent become for him an end in itself?

Is Brian Cashman's objective to achieve self-sufficiency? Is no major league player ever worth the price of even one premiere prospect? If not for Johan Santana or for CC Sabathia, then for whom? And if not now, when? Or is it only worth the price only when Cashman can acquire a player in a salary dump for the likes of CJ Henry and Matt Smith as he did with Bobby Abreu?

After all, isn’t one of the purposes of having a farm system abounding with young talent the luxury it provides to fill a hole on the major league roster when necessary, to acquire that indispensable player at the trade deadline when injury fells a critical player? The luxury that enables a GM to cultivate and retain some prospects and to trade others because many never will fulfill their promise.

Has Brian Cashman, then, steered the Yankees from one extreme on the continuum to the other, from a prodigal team that neglects its farm system and ignores its future to one that clings to it irrationally and esteems it as an end in itself?

One shouldn't so easily dismiss the idea. Remember, Cashman came of age in the mid-1980s as a Yankees intern when The Boss was busy undermining his GMs and frittering away his best prospects, trading Jose Rijo, Jay Howell, Erick Plunk, et. al for Rickey Henderson, Doug Drabek for Rick Rhoden, Al Leiter for Jesse Barfield, and in now infamous Seinfeld lore, swapping Jay Buhner for Ken Phelps.

Cashman’s reaction may be understandable. For a thin line separates the convert from the zealot, principle from dogma, and “attachment” for fetish. But that hardly exonerates him for crossing it.

And how else to regard a General Manager’s judgment when he leaves the impression that through the dog-days of July and August, he think his team can contend for the playoffs with Darrel Rasner and Sidney Ponson as its fourth and fifth starters? Or has Cashman deluded himself that Ian Kennedy and Alfredo Aceves are adequate substitutes if Rasner and Ponson falter?

Or is that he actually believes, despite his protests to the contrary, that Phil Hughes or Chien Ming-Wang or god forbid, Carl Pavano, will heal miraculously and ride in on a white-horse to save the season?

Or is the explanation more perverse still? Perhaps, Cashman is well aware of his rotation’s inadequacy but it’s a cost he’s willing to incur to protect his beloved farm even if it means missing the playoffs for the first time in 15 years. Even if it means another season will have elapsed without a championship as an aging nucleus nears its end. For make no mistake about it, a lineup fielding 7 of 9 hitters who turn 33 or older slouches toward regression. And really, how many more years can the Yankees indispensable player, their Roy Hobbs of closers, play above his game?

You see, as much as radicals, reactionaries gamble too. They gamble with time. By turning back the clock, they risk the wrath of the Fates of Age. For once Posada, Rivera, Giambi, Abreu, and perhaps, the immortal himself, Jeter, perform no better than the statistical mean, all the Phil Hughes and Jobas and Ian Kennedys won't matter one iota. Without a Hall of Fame closer or a prolific catcher, with a lineup in which only A-Rod and Cano can still hit, the Yankees will have morphed into a more expensive version of the Blue Jays.

Meanwhile, the AL East center of gravity, with Youklis, Pedroia, Ellsbury, and Moss; Crawford, Upton, Longoria, Navvaro, will have migrated to Tampa and Boston.

And for dreams of another championship in the Bronx, it will be too late.

THE SHADOWS OBSCURING THE LIGHT

Two weeks ago I observed that although the Yankees stood mired at .500, recent trends boded well for the future. A-Rod's and Posada's return had earned them, on average, almost an an additional run per game and while their runs allowed total had stabilized.

Evidently, the numbers didn't lie. Since then, the Yankees compiled a seven game winning streak, their longest of the season-- a streak Yankee fans, naturally, hoped would catapult them past the morass of .500 forevermore.

Alas, they have since proceeded to lose three of their last four and to two consummate National League mediocrities, the Reds and the Pirates besides. True, there's no shame in losing to Cy Young frontrunner Edison Volquez. On the other hand, a genuine playoff contender doesn't fail to score a run against a Reds' pitcher making his major league debut and then three days later fail to beat a Pirates pitcher who surrendered 4 BBs through 3 innings.

Losing 6-0 to Daryl Thompson and 12-5 to Tom Gorzelany, indeed, adumbrate shadows that threaten to cast a pall over the entire Yankees season.

R.I.S.P. or R.I.P

The box-scores illustrate. Against Thompson, the Yankees stranded 7 runners on base through five innings, 3 in scoring position. They even loaded the bases with no-outs in the 3rd inning and didn't score a single run.

The trend recurred three days later against Gorzelany. Through the six innings Gorzelany pitched, the Yankees stranded 7 runners on base, 5 in scoring position. The 3rd inning again proved the bugaboo, beginning with great promise and ending in futility. Runners on first and second with no out begat runners on first and third with one out. Not a one crossed the plate. A June 23rd entry at nomaas.org notes the paradox. Although the Yankees currently rank 6th in the AL in Runs Scored, averaging 4.30 per game, they rank 12th in batting with runners in scoring position, hitting .251.

I list each Yankees' individual RISP averages in the starting lineup below. The first figure consists of their overall RISP; the second represents their RISP with 2 outs.

1) Damon-- .351, .385
2) Jeter-- .303, .333
3) Abreu -- .265, .414
4) A-Rod-- .242, .214
5) Matsui -- .338, .294
6) Giambi -- .150, .138
7) Posada-- .333, .385
8) Cano-- .213, .237
9) Cabrera- .231, .242

Of course, in such circumstance, the players themselves exercise most control over their fate and can address the shortcoming by executing. However, the number above suggest, perhaps, a few minor changes could help matters.

The Yankees might consider switching Abreu and Matsui and inverting the order of Posada and Giambi. Apart from grouping batters with higher RISP averages, the change, potentially, offers two ancillary benefits as well-- (i) spurring Abreu and (ii) dividing consecutive lefties in the middle of the order with a switch-hitter, a tactic Joe Torre especially liked. The benefits of the latter are self-evident. The benefits of the former less so, accordingly, I elaborate below.

BOOSTING BOBB-AY

Since 2007, opposing pitchers have neutralized the Yankees' three hitter's greatest asset, Abreu's plate discipline. The precitpitous drop in his walk totals bear this out. From 2004 through 2006, Abreu averaged 122 BBs per season. In 2007, the number fell to 84. Through almost half a season in 2008, the number has dropped to a paltry 28. And with it, Abreu's on-base percentage has ebbed as well. A career average on-base average of .405 eroded to .369 in '07 and .336 in '08.

Now, a superficial reading of the numbers could imply Abreu's plate discipline has diminished with age and the regression in skills all players eventually undergo. However, further examination reveals that Abreu has proven as discriminating as ever as the plate. And the decline in Abreu's walk totals stem much more from how pitchers approach him than plate recklessness. Indeed, the average number of pitches Abreu sees per plate appearance has remained constant over the same period: 4.3 in '04, 4.4 in '05, 4.45 in '06, 4.4 in '07, 4.3 in '08.

What has changed however is how pitchers attack Abreu and with good reason. A-ROD looms behind him. Opposing pitchers, as such, eager to avoid facing A-Rod with a runner on-base, refuse Abreu a free pass and make sure to throw him strikes. Because Abreu's doesn't fit the profile of the typical 3-hole, power-hitter, starters figure they have less to lose by challenging him with strikes and daring him to beat them with the bat.

The numbers attest to theory as follows. In Abreu's 321 Plate Appearances in 2008, he has faced an 0-2, 1-2, or 2-2 count in 144 of them or 45%. By contrast, Abreu has been ahead in the count 2-0, 3-0, 3-1 in only 41 plate appearances or 13% of the time.

Compare these totals to the Yankees current BB leader, Giambi, who has earned 36 walks and has averaged 4.1 pitches per plate appearance. In Giambi's 261 Plate Appearance, he, by contrast, has been behind in the count (0-2, 1-2, or 2-2) only 89 times or 34%. The occasion he has been ahead (2-0, 3-0, 3-1) 36 times or 14%, on the other hand, parallel Abreu's.

The parallel in the times they're ahead in the count combined with the discrepancy in times each is behind would tend, as such, to support the thesis that a concerted strategy on the part of opposing pitchers accounts for the difference.

Now, most hitters would envy Abreu's spot in the 3-hole, in front of A-Rod precisely because that hitter would see a greater percentage of strikes, and hence better selection of pitches to hit than he might in a different slot. But again, to reiterate, Abreu is not a classic 3-hole hitter. His greatest strength is not his power but his plate discipline and his speed. (He actually more closely fits the profile of a 2nd hitter.)

As such, placing Abreu after A-Rod might improve Abreu's ability to get on-base ahead of Posada and Giambi, without similarly diminishing Matsui's on-base percentage in the 3-hole because he has greater power than Abreu, at least when healthy, and poses a greater home-run threat if thrown strikes.

The Yankees also could experiment with Giambi in the 3-hole as well, mirroring some of the danger the Manny-Ortiz combo has presented opposing hitters the last three years.

REPLACING WANG

The other looming threat to the Yankees' season comes from the catastrophic blow Wang's injury dealt them on June 14th.

The 90-wins prefigured by the 5.1 runs per game the Yankees have averaged since Posada's return to the line-up on June 5th had assumed the team wouldn't allow more than the 4.5 to 4.6 runs per game they had registered to date. That in fact, the number, with Joba's addition to the rotation, would improve. However, with the loss of Wang, only hubris would lead one to cling to the assumption. Alas, the very quality the Yankees' GM has demonstrated in abundance over the last two years, enough, in fact, to warrant anxiety, if not consternation, about whether he can or will acquire a pitcher to alleviate the loss.

The Yankees cannot expect to overtake either the Rays or the Red Sox with Darrell Rasner and Dan Giese occupying rotation spots the Yankees expected Wang and Hughes to fill. In 2 of his last three outings, Rasner has surrendered 7 runs, an inconsistency the Yankees, perhaps, could withstand from a 5th starter or even a 4th starter, if Wang-Pettitte and a rejuvenated Mussina led it.

Giese's presence compounds the problem because the Yankees can't rely on him to pitch a full season let alone pitch effectively through a full season. In 2007, Giese threw 73 innings; in '06, 72 innings; 38 innings in '05, and 83 innings in '04. In 2008, the journeyman pitcher already thrown 73 innings. Worse, he's never pitched a full season as a starter.

Sure, Ian Kennedy could return in July and/or Phil Hughes in mid-August. But neither is likely to replace Wang in his reliability, his 6.6 inning per start average, or for that matter, equal Wang in his performance, not in '08 anyway.

Only by acquiring a pitcher from outside the organization can the Yankees realistically sustain the loss of Wang and still contend for a playoff spot. The pitcher doesn't necessarily have to be of Wang's caliber; that is, CC Sabathia, Eric Bedard, or Ben Sheets. The latter two pose their own injury and performance risks anyway. A pitcher like Derek Lowe may suffice. Still, a known commodity is a must.

The greatest obstacle, however, this year, as the trade deadline approaches, may not the scarcity of available starters, as in past years. No, the greatest obstacle the Yankees may confront this season, come July 31st, is their own GM's willingness to procure one. Indeed, Cashman's recent intrasingence about trading his prospects recalls ex-Angels GM, Bill (The Roster is Set in) Stone-man.

STONE CASH

As I have argued here before, Cashman's regard for the prospects with which, to his credit, he has replenished a barren farm system, at times, has verged on fetish. Comments he made to the New York Post, during the Santana melodrama, about the "attachment" he's developed to Hughes, Kennedy, and company indicates as much. As does the story Cashman persists in rehearsing about how he agonized over trading four middling prospects to the Phillies for Bobby Abreu in 2006. If trading a package led by CJ Henry and Matt Smith for a major league RF with a 5.5 WARP (wins over an average replacement player) keeps him awake all night and proves so traumatic, even in retrospect, that he continues to recall the epsidode, what does this say about the GM's constitution and judgment?

Call the phenomenon what you will: "the endowment fallacy"-- our tendency to price what we possess above what we would pay for it-- or "the Pygmalion effect"-- the builder's proclivity to idolize his creation. In either case, the neuroses betrays the same symptom: The value of Yankees' prospects seems to increase in direct proportion to their distance from New York.

Since Cashman assumed plenary power in 2005, one prospect selected under his tenure has made a measurable impact, Joba. Hughes' and Edwar Ramirez's contribution have been too sporadic. And while Cashman promoted Cano and Wang, they each preceded Cashman's tenure as the full-fledged GM.

Of course no prudent Yankees fan wants the GM to mortgage their future by trading a Phil Hughes or Ian Kennedy for a starter the team controls for only two months. Nonetheless, Cashman has to appreciate that the purpose of a farm system is not self-sufficiency. Rather, one of the virtues of enjoying the Yankees ample resources and having a minor-league organization teeming with young pitching prospects besides is the opportunity it offers to spread your risk by trading prospective talent for proven performance. More importantly, the GM has to capitalize while those prospects still retain their value as prospects because few will actually realize their promise.

In the meantime, Cashman has a month before the creeping shadows envelop the season in darkness. Let's hope, by then, he's seen the light.

THE LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL

Another crushing late-inning loss. Another middling homestand. Another opportunity to gain ground squandered.

"A team is its record", says Bill Parcells, the sage of banality. Well by this measure, through 64 games, the Yankees personify mediocrity. They stand at 32-32, mired at .500 for over two months, having risen to two or more games above mediocrity's benchmark twice, at 9-7 and 12-10, the last time on April 23rd.

However, if a team is its record, it is not only its record. Often, there are trends, signs, indices in how they play that a record belies, omens that betoken a future that differs from its past.

THE RETURN OF A-ROD; THE RESURGENCE OF GIAMBI

In my previous post, "History's Mirror," (May 19, 2008), I observed that through 44 games, the Yankees had scored 179 runs, a decline of 24% from the total they'd amassed at an identical point in 2007. However, the Yankees' loss of A-Rod and Posada through the lion share of those games accounted, I argued, for much of the drop.

In the 22 games since A-Rod returned to the Yankees lineup, the team has scorded 118 runs. Their average per game, that is, has risen from 4.1 runs scored to 5.2 runs scored.

If the last five of those 22 game are any indication, then Posada's return on June 5th heralds a more potent lineup still. In fact, with Giambi's resurgence, there's isn't any reason why the Yankees couldn't approximate the 6.0 runs per game they averaged in 2007, even if Cano continues to founder for the season's duration and Posada produces closer to his career average. (Giambi created 43 runs in all of 2007, according to Baseball Reference. In 2008, Giambi's Runs Creation figure already totals 40 runs.)

What does this mean for the season's duration?

Well, through 66 games, the Yankees also have allowed 300 runs or a 4.55 average per game. So let's hold this figure constant for a moment and extrapolate.

Assume the Yankees Runs Scored trend continues and the Yankees continue to score on average 5.1 runs per game for the rest of the season. (The projection, of course, basically excludes the marked increase in production they can expect from their catcher because Posada only has played in 4 of the last 22 games.)

At a 5.1 RS average and a 4.54 RA average over the Yankees remaining 96 games, James' Pyhtagorean theorem would predict a team winning percentage of .558, giving the Yankees about 53 to 53 wins over their remaining 96, and amassing them 86 to 87 wins for the season.

Should Posada's return increase the Yankees' average RS total only marginally, say from 489 total scored runs over the remaining 96 games to 528, or an average increase of .4 runs per game, the Yankees winning percentage would increase to .594, or 57 wins. and predict, in turn, a 90-win season. And if 90 wins doesn't necessarily qualify them for the playoffs, it should at least make them a viable playoff contender.

RUNS ALLOWED: CAN THE PITCHING HOLD?

Of course, the calcuations above assume the Yankees' pitching neither improves nor regresses over the season's duration.

And to be fair, the reason why the Yankees' record over the last 22 games since A-Rod's return has not risen much above its .500 benchmark is because the team has allowed more runs just as it has scored them.

Through 44 games the Yankees had allowed 197 runs, an average of 4.48 runs per game. Over the next 22 games, the Yankees surrendered 101 runs, an average of 4.59 runs per game.

Thus lies the cause for optimism. The increase in runs scored (1.1 average per game) dramatically exceeds the average increase in runs allowed over the last 22 games (.11 per game)

Given Wang and Pettitte's aberrant performances in their last four outings, in fact, the Yankees should consider themselves fortunate their average runs allowed has increased dramatically.

That it has not, however-- that Wang and Pettitte stand to improve, even if Rasner and Mussina regress and that whatever Joba provides as a 5th starter has to surpass every other alternative-- should provide some measure of confidence that the Runs Allowed figure assumed above will bear fruit in the end. In fact, should the Yankees' pitching cede, on average 4.54 runs per game over the season's duration, their runs allowed will total 736 or about 40 runs better than their 777 total of last season.

In that eventuality, a 90 win season and playoff contention doesn't defy the realm of possibility.

BULLPEN WOES: JOBA VOID OR GIRARDI FOLLY?

This writer, as my regular readers know, has endorsed wholeheartedly the Yankees' decision to return Joba Chamberlain to his rightful place in the starting rotation. Quite simply, as a starter Chamberlian can influence more innings and obtain more outs and with greater regularity over the course of a season than as a set-up reliever. (See below "Joba For Starter," April 13, 2008.) Indeed, sabermetricians' win-share statistics (WARP and VORP) reveals that even the league-average starter contributes more wins to his team than a premiere set-up man.

The benefits of Joba resuming the role in which he soared through the Yankees' farm system last year outweighs the loss his departure from the bullpen will entail. That isn't to say, the cost will be negligible; it won't be.

The Yankees' crushing loss to the Orioles in 11 innings on May 27 only dramatizes the void Joba leaves behind. It was exasperating enough when Ross Ohlendorf blew a 4-run lead in the 5th inning, surrendering 3 home-runs in a single inning. But then LaTroy Hawkins capped the ineptitude, repeating the feat in the 11th, squandering a 1-run lead and ultimately, losing the ball game.

Had Joba been available to pitch that night, the game certainly would have unfolded very differently. Whether it would have affected the outcome is another matter. (Keep in mind: Girardi likely would have deployed Joba in the innings Farnsworth and Ramirez pitched and hence not have had him in reserve for the 11th inning even were he available.)

Was last night an ill-fated harbinger or just a single vivid illustration? Only time will tell, but thus far, the post-Joba bullpen hardly has provided cause for optimism.

THE PERSONNEL VOID
Of course, a bullpens' loss of its 2nd best reliever would exact a toll under any circumstance, whomever the player, whatever the team.

However, Joba's absence especially taxes the Yankees present bullpen because injuries have felled their two most potent and reliable relief pitchers through the season's first two months: Brian Bruney and Jonathan Albaladejo.

Bruney had posted a miniscule 1.59 ERA over 11 innings; and Albaladejo, a 3.95 ERA in 13.7 innings.

With the exception of Edward Ramirez, there isn't a single other reliever in the bullpen with under a 4.00 ERA. Even Farnsworth, who has improved this year, but is still hardly a paragon of consistency, has a 4.24 ERA and a 1.54 WHIP over 23.3 innings.

Compare this to the Yankees' AL East divisional rivals. Excluding their closers, I list below the number of relievers each possesses with under a 4.00 ERA while having thrown at least 16 innings. I include each bullpen's total ERA as well.

• Red Sox- 3 - (Okajima, Aardsma, Lopez); Total Bullpen ERA = 4.33
• Jays - 4- (Carslon, Downs, Tallet, Fraser); Total Bullpen ERA = 2.90
• O's - 4- (Bradford, Sarfate, Johnson, Albers); Total Bullpen ERA = 3.17 ERA
• Rays- 3- (Wheeler, Miller, Howell); Total Bullpen ERA = 3.59
• Yankees w/o Joba - ZERO - (including Edwar's 14 IP, one)
• Yankees Bullpen's Total ERA (w/o Joba) = 3.95 ERA

Superficially, then, the Yankees' prospects of overcoming Joba's absence look prety bleak.

GIRARDI'S BULLPEN MANAGEMENT

To reiterate, the Yankees bullpen's preponderant deficiency is one of personnel. With Joba's transition to the rotation, Albaladejo out for another 2-6, and Bruney, perhaps, gone for the season, the Yankees, outside their closer, presently have a sum total of one relief pitcher, Edwar Ramirez, they can trust and another, in Farnsworth, who inspires something closer to equivocal faith or outright agnosticism.

Add to this a starting rotation averaging 5.26 IP per start and the Yankees have a prescription, at best, for mediocrity even if the lineup suddenly regains last year's proficiency.

Still, the Yankees' bullpen's shortcoming doesn't stem entirely from inadequate performance. Its manager's stewardship has contributed to it, or at the very least, it raises troubling questions. For all the vitriolic criticism heaped on Joe Torre for abusing certain relievers and ravaging others' arms-- the former a valid critcism; the latter, an exaggerated one-- Joe Girardi hasn't exactly demonstrated inimitable genius in utilizing his bullpen either. The injuries and lackluster personnel, notwithstanding.

Mussina's two outings against the Red Sox only consist of the most dramatic and obvious example. Indeed, Girardi's use of Ross Ohlendorf has ill-served the team as well. By appointing him the team's de facto long reliever, the manager is wasting an arm capable of throwing a 95 mph sinker best confined to single innings of work.

Instead, Ohlendorf has pitched more innings than any other Yankees reliever, 29.7 IPs, which may or may not account for his bloated 6.37 ERA and dismal 1.61 WHIP. But greater scrunity reveals how Girardi's deployment of Ohlendorf has diminished both his value and his efficacy.

Of Ohlendorf's 16 appearances, the Yankees have reserved him to one inning or less in only 7 appearances; in the remainder the Yankees have pitched him as few as two innings and as many as 3.3 innings. The disparity is telling. In his first full inning of work (15.1 inning of his total 29.7), Ohlendorf's ERA drops to 4.70 and his WHIP to 1.46. In fact, excluding that dreadful outing against the Mets where he surrendered 4 earned runs in 0.33 inning, Ohlendorf's ERA in his first inning of work is 2.35, with a WHIP of 1.17. Those are extraordinary numbers, rivalling even the Great Joba's 2.42 ERA and 1.12 WHIP.

Girardi has to be aware that after an inning of use Ohlendorf's proficiency plummets, so why does he continue to use him in long-relief. Can't someone from Scranton perform this role? Meanwhile, the Yankees squander a power arm and potential formidable reliever on mop-up duty.

Then there's the question of why it's taken Girardi so long to realize Edwar Ramirez's potential. Through 14 innings, Ramirez, astoundingly, has posted 0.00 ERA and has a 1.14 WHIP. Yet in Ramirez's 12 appearances, Girardi has used him only three times in critical situations, that is, where one run or less has separated the Yankees and the opposition. For some inexplicable reason, Girardi almost invariably calls on Kyle Farnsworth instead. I don't blame him; the bias for hard-throwing relievers is endemic. But wasn't the front-office's insistence that Girardi would excel Torre as a manager based principally on Girardi's supposed penchant for studying the stats. So what does he see that we don't?

Finally, there's the question of Jose Veras. Until Monday's debacle, Veras had posted a 3.12 ERA with an extraordinary 0.80 WHIP through 8 2/3 innings. True, the sample set is too small to draw any definitive conclusions. Nonetheless, Veras' performance certainly commended him over Hawkins both to start Monday's 8th inning and to pitch last night in the 11th. At the very least, Girardi has to start testing Veras in more close games and pressure situations to appraise his potential. At the moment, the verdict is still out.

Apart from re-considering Ohlendorf, Veras, and Ramirez's use and role, the organization may also summon an arm from their farm system-- Robertson or Cox from AAA and/or Melancon or Alfredo Acevedes in AA. But the Yankees shouldn't delude themselves into thinking every young arm, however great its potential, can duplicate the immediate impact Joba exerted last season.

The Yankees, accrodingly, face a forbidding task ahead. Finding someone to replace Joba in the bullpen-- whether in the 8th inning, or in the 6th and 7th innings if Farnsworth assumes the set-up role-- will not be easy. Arms like Joba's are rare; his poise and confidence, scarcer still. As such, no one can fill Chamberlain's shoes. Yet whether the Yankees can find someone to follow in his tracks may well determine their fate this season.

In the meantime, let the auditions begin.

HISTORY'S MIRROR: THE YANKEES 1ST QUARTER REPORT

Over the last decade, one of the great revolutions in Major League Baseball, and all professional sports for that matter, has arisen in front-office personnel. The Ivy League statistical prodigy has dispossessed the former professional athlete. While corporate financial models and Wall Street metrics increasingly shape team's decisions, strategies, and worldview.

So perhaps, it's fitting in assessing the Yankees' progress through the long, arduous trial of a six month season to borrow a corporate index: the Quarterly Report. A 162-game season, after all, divides almost evenly by four. And with the Yankees' having played just over 40 games, at this writing, their season warrants one.

What label then to affix the Yankees' First Quarter of 20 wins and 24 losses that has them languishing the AL East cellar? "Mediocrity Incarnate" or "A Gentlemen's 'C', as in Cashman's Comeuppance". Or perhaps, resuming the Wall Street metaphor, perhaps, we should call the New York Yankees: "Bear Stearns"

So much for the promise that Girardi's rigorous Spring Training would forestall yet another lackluster start. Thus far, the 2008 season mirrors the 2007 one. In fact, on May 22, 2007, just after the conclusion of the 2007 Subway Series' first installment, the New York Yankees were 20-24, the very record they possess following 2008's first Subway Series' finale.

The salient difference: in 2007, the Yankees were 10.5 games out of first place, 9 games in the loss column. In 2008, the Yankees are only 6 games out of first place, 5 games in the loss column. On the one hand, this should console fans because less distance separates them from 1st place. On the other hand, it should cause them chagrin. Greater parity in the league means the climb upward will prove more difficult.

2007 REDUX?

Indeed, the 20-24 record doesn't exhaust the parallels. Both '07 and '08 teams have sustained injuries to key players that stunted their potential and marred their performance.

In 2007, recall, the Yankees pitching staff bore the brunt of the Baseball's Gods curse. Wang and Mussina had stints on the DL. Pavano and Rasner were lost for the season. Karstens and Hughes each missed two to three months. The Scranton shuttle shufffled Wright, Clippard, DeSalvo, and Igawa into and out of the rotation. Indeed, between Opening Day and May 30, 2007, the Yankees resorted to 11 different pitchers to start games.

In 2008, by contrast, the injuries largely have beset the lineup. A-Rod has missed 20 of their first 44 games (45%); Posada, 25 of the 44 or (59%) of the season. While Hughes, again, will miss 2 to 3 months of the season, but he wasn't pitching too well anyway. And Rasner, thus far, has shown he, at least, can shoulder Hughes' innings.

The real setback in 2008 has been the injuries to the lineup. Still, can the combined loss of just two hitters account for the Yankees' current offensive inepitude? (After all, didn't the 2005 team lose Gary Sheffield and Hideki Matsui early in the season and prosper nonetheless.) Well, yes.

• Through 44 in 2007, the Yankees had scored 236.
• Through 44 games in 2008, the Yankees have scored 179.
• Percentage Decline = 24%

In 2007, A-Rod accounted for 17% of the Yankees' runs (RC= 166, Yankees total runs = 968); Posada, 12 % (117 of 968).

In 2008, Morgan Ensberg and Jose Molina, the Yankees primary two replacements for A-Rod and Posada, have RC totals in 2008 of 4 and 5 respectively (or 2 to 3 percent).

Accordingly, the loss of A-Rod and Posada (-29%), in conjunction with the negligible production the Yankees have received from their replacements (+4%), would account for the approximately 25% drop in the Yankees' offensive production.

What about the pitching staff? With the exception of Phil Hughes, the Baseball Gods, mercifully, have spared the starting rotation from rehearsal of 2007. Still, 2008 starters hardly have distinguished themselves either.

• Through 44 games in 2007, the Yankees allowed 209 runs
• Through 44 games in 2008, the Yankees have allowed 197.

Considering that in 2007, Wang and Mussina each spent time on the DL in April and May and the likes of Wright, DeSalvo, Clippard and Igawa started many of those games, by comparison, the 2008 Runs Allowed totals look especially alarming.

• Through 44 games, 2008 Yankees pitching staff = 4.48 ERA, 1.35 WHIP
• Through 44 games, 2007 Yankees pitching staff = 4.74 ERA, 1.42 WHIP

To do full justice to the 2008 pitch staff, however, would necessitate evaluating the bullpen and starters separately. The bullpen in 2008, does not in anyway resemble the tattered, feckless group that characterized the 2007 bullpen until Joba's arrival.

• 2008: Yankees starters have a 5.04 ERA over 234 IP-- avg. = 5.31 IP/G (44 games)
• 2008: Yankees bullpen has a 3.62 ERA, over 151.2 IP.

Compare 2007's totals by season's end.

• 2007: Yankees starters had 4.57 ERA over 921 IPs-- avg. = 5.68 IP/G (162 games)
• 2007: Yankees reliever had 4.37 ERA over 529.2 IP

The stats would seem to prove what even the casual observer of the 2008 team's pitching staff, no doubt, already has concluded. The bullpen has improved. The starting pitching, on the other hand, despite all the injuries it sustained in 2007, hasn't performed much better this season.

Evidently, Cashman's much-ballyhooed re-investment in the farm system is still years away from paying dividends in the starting rotation. As this writer has observed before, young starting pitching often takes years to blossom. The problem is that the Yankees' aging lineup doesn't have many years before it withers. Indeed, Giambi and Damon already bear its marks.

2007 v. 2008: QUARTERS TWO THROUGH FOUR

So does the Yankees trajectory of 2007-- a woeful 1st Quarter that preceded a 94-win season-- bode well for the 2008 team? Not exactly.

In 2007, the Yankees' dramatic resurrection stemmed from a tender 2nd half schedule. At the 2007 All-Star Break, the Yankees were 43-43. After it, the Yankees went 51-25, by feeding on the AL's carrion, KC, Tampa, Chicago, Baltimore. What's more, they only had to travel once to the West Coast and only had to play but 3 games there (against Anaheim).

The second half of the Yankees schedule in 2008 greatly exceeds 2007's in difficulty, perhaps by mulitple orders of magnitude. They Yankees have to travel twice to the West Coast-- twice, in fact, in a matter of only 4 weeks (August 8th and again September 5th). Meanwhile, on those two trips, they have to play their bete noire, Anaheim, 6 times. What's more each trip's travel schedule will prove exacting in itself. The first trip to Anaheim comes in between two series West of the Mississippi, preceded in Texas, culminated in Minnesota. The second trip takes the Yankees from a 7:00pm game on September 4th in Tampa 3,000 miles across the Continent to play a night game on September 5th in Seattle.

Overall, after the '08 All-Star break, the Yankees have to play their nemesis, Anaheim, a total of 10 times. (They also have 9 games againt Boston.)

The other reason why the Yankees cannot expect to repeat 2007's formula for success is because the AL is simply more competitive this season; the AL East, especially so.

In the 2007, against non-AL East opponents the Yankees posted winning records against the following teams:

• 9-1 against KC
• 6-0 against Cleveland
• 5-1 against Texas;
• 5-2 against Minnesota
• 6-4 against the White Sox

The Yankees' record against the AL East in 2007:

• 10-8 Boston
• 10-8 Toronto
• 9-9 Baltimore
• 10-8 Tampa

The Yankees will hard-pressed to duplicate this success in 2008. They already have lost 4 of 6 to Cleveland, 2 of 3 against KC and Baltimore, and are 1-4 against Detroit.

2008: THE HINGE OF JUNE

Given the difficulty of the Yankees' second-half schedule, if they expect to reverse 2008's inauspicious beginning, they have to do so immediately. They cannot afford to finish with a .500 record at the All-Star break and expect to win 51 games following it. The fate of their season hinges on the present, with their performance over the next 6 six weeks deciding its outcome.

The 2007's schedule post-All Star break remission occurs this year in June. Between tomorrow and the July 4th weekend, when the Yankees next play the Red Sox, the Yankees schedule lightens considerably. Over the next 42 games (23 of them at-home), the Yankees play these opponents the following number of games:

• Baltimore- 6 times
• Texas-- 3 times
• Houston- 3 times
• San Diego- 3 times
• Pittsburgh- 3 times
• Cincinatti-- 3 times
• Mets- 4 times
• Minn- 4 times
• KC-- 4 times
• Toronto- 3 times
• Seattle-- 3 times
• Oakland- 3 times

With A-Rod returning tomorrow and Posada, sometime in early June, the Yankees have no excuse for not playing well over .500 baseball for this stretch. A record of 28-17-- hardly a quixotic expecation-- would reverse their fortunes, return them to respectability, and fortify their confidence for the challenges that await them in July and beyond.

28-17 would make them 48-41 overall. And with parity prevailing throughout the AL, 48-41 would enable the Yankees to rehearse their 2007 trajectory, rising from the dead to assume their rightful position in the playoff race and to become the contenders they are.

But be warned. Karl Marx once observed, History always repeats itself: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce. Indeed, what could be more tragic than laughter in the Bronx?